The Internal and External Obstacles and their Impact on Pluralism

Edward Channer, 6th June 2012In the current context of the Arab Spring, where nations are on the road toward creating their own form of democracy, the process of achieving pluralism has become a significant factor. As Marcel Wissenburg comments, this process may be termed ‘pluralization’. Pluralization, Wissenburg states, is ‘the emergence of “polities” other than the state, where polity stands for any form of social organization within which (among other things) politics takes place’.  The ‘polities’ Wissenburg speaks of can be interpreted as different sections of society – religious or ethnic minorities, for example – who are politically mobilised and aware. Pluralisation, therefore, is the process of these groups’ ‘emergence’ onto the country’s new political scene.In more practical terms, as will be the tone of this paper, pluralisation is where formerly unrecognised, neglected or unacknowledged groups within society begin to gain stakes and representation in the country’s political system, where a government accepts their presence and acknowledges and protects their right to live in that country and follow their own traditions and beliefs. In post-revolutionary society, this translates to the long-term disenfranchised now becoming enfranchised as legitimate and equal members of the population, complete with a political voice. In this paper, I will account for the driving force behind the pursuit of pluralism and provide a brief explanation on the political and historical sensitivity of the issue within western-MENA region relations. I will then examine some of the challenges arising in the process of pluralisation in transitioning countries, with particular reference to Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood. This assessment is in the light of work undertaken by Forward Thinking and the Nyon Process, who work across the MENA region, Europe and the US to facilitate and promote inclusive dialogue with all political actors with significant constituency. Conclusions have been reached, therefore, following regular liaison and engagement with key religious and political figures, parties and movements within the region, specifically Tunisia and Egypt. It must be remembered that challenges discussed here are by no means exhaustive and complete. Rather, this paper serves to simply highlight and discuss many of the common issues we as an organisation have encountered as a result of our position and associations within the region.Social pluralisation as a political driving forceThe Arab Spring unleashed pluralist revolutions. The very social and cultural composition of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, for example, displays social pluralism at its greatest. The revolutions connected people of various religio-ethnic backgrounds in the face of a common cause, a common dictator. All had to make a stand so all could benefit. It is this social unity, where different groups have protested alongside one another, which drives the pursuit of pluralism within a country’s new politics. Such social unity was evident in the first protests to take place in Tahrir Square. As an organisation, we have heard how, in the early days of the Egyptian revolution, a wide spectrum of society was present in the demonstrations, driven by a core youth element. This spectrum, we have heard, included Muslims (incorporating members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists), Christians and Secularists. What is most significant, however, is the motivation of the individual, rather than an organisation, to protest. For instance, we have heard evidence to suggest that, even if organised groups (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) did not specifically instruct their members to protest in Tahrir, individuals went and did so nonetheless. This illustrates, to some degree, a prioritising of national concern over any organisational, religious or sectarian affiliations. This social unification has, inevitably, led to revolutionary groups realising the significance of pluralism in achieving fair democracy. As we have found through our ongoing dialogues, both the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and Ennahdha in Tunisia have repeatedly stressed their striving to achieve a pluralist government to represent the populations of their respective nations. Despite this desire for pluralism, deep-rooted in transitioning societies, there are, of course, obstacles to this progress: numerous, complex and invariably inter-related.Political and historical sensitivity of pluralismFirst, however, I feel it is important to highlight the sensitivity of dealing with pluralism whilst attempting to construct international partnerships. This, in turn, illustrates external obstacles present in the democratisation process. There have been repeated statements from the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, Ennahdha in Tunisia, and the wider Muslim Brotherhood that all social, ethnic and religious groups must have a stake in the new politics of their respective countries. The Freedom and Justice Party’s decision to not exceed a majority in the now-dissolved parliament, and the ‘president for all’ speech of the new president Mohammed Morsi, displays this to some extent, as does Ennahdha’s pursuit and formation of a coalition with secular parties CPR and Ettakatol. Furthermore, certain Salafist parties (such as Al Nour in Egypt and Al Asala in Egypt and Tunisia) have also stressed their commitment to a pluralist approach, albeit (as with the Freedom and Justice Party and Ennahdha) within an Islamic framework. As these groups have found themselves more and more in the political spotlight, so they continue to enforce an official party line of welcoming wide social representation in politics. The role of Islam here, rather than being a force for prohibiting pluralism as some in the west may have ascertained, is described in actual fact as an enforcer and protector of pluralism; ‘Freedom is Islam. Equality is Islam’, as one Muslim political actor attempted to assure European parliamentarians in a meeting we organised late last year. The need for Muslim political groups to continue vocalising their support for political pluralism stems from not only internal concerns at the prospect of a Muslim Brotherhood government, but also from an overriding western attitude of concern that has gotten stronger with the onset of the Arab Spring – concern at Islamists coming to power. The consistent foreign scepticism and pressure that has emerged from this concern is potentially damaging; it has caused some anger and frustration due to the western hypocrisy it demonstrates. Certain nations in the west have been openly willing to support past authoritarian regimes which prohibited pluralism so long as their own interests were met and safeguarded. Therefore, although pluralism is indeed vital to transitioning states, it would be potentially damaging to western-MENA region relations if the issue is constantly raised as a criterion to be met. This, in itself, is an external obstacle to progress and to the formation of healthy international relationships. Rather than such hypocritical demands, a new form of dialogue has to be reached where the relationship between transitioning states and the west is one based on mutual honesty and values over vested interests. Acknowledging the elected representatives of the people and supporting pluralism are two such values.Barriers in achieving pluralismThe sensitivity over the issue of pluralism here, on the international stage, indicates exactly why it is a topic that has received so much scrutiny, and why different political groups have been judged over their tackling of pluralism. In the Egyptian example, the motives behind the dominating Muslim Brotherhood’s consistent pledge to introduce pluralism into the nation’s new politics indicate two potential, different internal barriers to achieving this pluralism: one which is cynical of the Brotherhood’s motives, the other which is admiring of them. Which barrier is to be believed depends upon personal interpretation. Yet, nonetheless, they are both indicative of the types of internal barriers to pluralism that can arise in democratising nations. The former, cynical interpretation of the Brotherhood’s pluralist motives is that their willingness for pluralism has been a façade to appease the more secular and Christian elements of Egyptian society into reluctantly allowing the Freedom and Justice Party to assume a dominating role in politics, with the false promise of wider societal representation. This may also account for the Brotherhood’s last minute decision to field a candidate for the Egyptian presidency – an attempt to strengthen their hold on political structures. Whether these power-hungry motives are to be believed or not, they still indicate how the desire for political dominance of any single group may inhibit political pluralism. Indeed, this leads on to a further barrier, which is the unbalanced level of organisational capability of political groups. Certain movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood for example, are more able to motivate their grassroots in times of elections to capitalise more fully on their traditional support. There is an ever-present danger that this occurs as other, less-mobilised voices (yet with significant constituencies) become unwittingly excluded from political representation. External barriers arise here when foreign benefactors focus support on one political group, again mobilising them at the expense of others with inferior resources. To take a less cynical view of the Brotherhood, however, the second interpretation of their motives, and the one that, from our conversations with the Freedom and Justice Party, appears more likely and credible, is that a tension has arisen between securing the transition to democracy on one hand and allowing for a wide, pluralist approach on the other; for this wide approach may allow remnants of the old regime back into the political sphere who will then sabotage the transitional process and restrict any pluralist approach. To avoid this, and to safeguard the aims of the revolution, the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood may have had to take advantage of their superior organisational capability and seek more power than they originally intended. [As a side note, the Brotherhood have acknowledged to us an awareness of their level of organisation and expressed a desire to tackle the issue by promoting the development of other political parties.] The threat posed by an entrenched former regime, and its consequent barrier to pluralism, has been proved very real in Egypt. The judicial decision to dismiss Parliament on 14th June, the SCAF granting itself legislative, budgetary and military control, and the very fact that Mubarak’s Prime Minister, Ahmed Shafiq, was allowed to stand for the presidency with great financial backing, are all signs of a resurgent former regime. This resurgence has created a very real internal barrier to achieving pluralism. Consequently, the Brotherhood may feel that damage to both their reputation and immediate pluralist politics are sacrifices worth making in order to repel Mubarak’s regime and ensure pluralism in the long term. Whilst on the topic of the Brotherhood’s political motivation, the role of ideology in politics must also be explored. Indeed, it is ideology which some may use as evidence for the aforementioned potential barrier to pluralism – that of the Brotherhood deliberately seizing political dominance to create a hardline, non-pluralist Islamic state. However, it has been stressed repeatedly that this is far from the intention of the Freedom and Justice Party, and their honest account of Muslim ideologies in relation to political practice is testament to this.As a mindset that may be shaped by faith, be non-faith-based or a combination of the two, for example, ideology connected to faith is not necessarily a barrier impacting upon pluralism. Indeed, rather than any ideological dogma precluding pluralism from government in an attempt to ensure a form of religious or social purity, the most significant impact this form of ideology has on pluralism is caused by the way in which the relationship between ideology and politics has developed in recent history. Through the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak, and the traditional Egyptian Salafist belief of their role being exclusive to politics, ideology of Islamist groups has existed completely independent of the political system. Consequently, the lack of ideological and political amalgamation means that ideological groups, in this context, have never had to lend their perspectives to national ruling structures. As can be seen now through the efforts of the Freedom and Justice Party and, even, through the growing political experience of the Salafists in Egypt, ideological viewpoint has largely had to give way to the practical precedents involved in governance. As we have heard the Freedom and Justice Party often state, therefore, the demands of guiding a nation in the best interests for all have emphasized the importance of pragmatism over ideology. This movement can only occur with exposure to political practice. Without it, ideology naturally assumes priority over the practical approach fundamental to leading a modern democracy. Whereas the ideology of a political group may prove flexible to meet the demands of democracy, a further barrier is present when one considers the more rigid ideology of the group’s constituency. As a political party must remain fundamentally in-tune with the people they represent, they must of course take into account the full spectrum of the views of the people. Where views exist that lie in contrast to the principle of pluralism in democracy, as in certain ultra-conservative religious communities, the tension between representing the constituent base and supporting a widely representative political system is heightened. It is important, therefore, that it is not only the political party itself that is exposed to the principles of fair representation in politics, but the entire community the party represents as well. Effective and frequent communication between the two entities is thereby essential. This is illustrated in the power-sharing agreement reached in Northern Ireland, where such an agreement was only reached, and given lasting strength, through participating parties with different ideologies consistently reporting back to their constituent communities. A strong and ever-present connection between grass-roots society – inclusive of all groups and minorities – and the governing structure is fundamental to pluralisation. The dictators of the past had no such connection, and now it is paramount that new leaders ensure the creation and development of new, democratic institutions that are able to provide this link. Such institutions include a free and unbiased media, effective and widely available local authorities (free from corruption), trade unions etcetera. These institutions provide the crucial, scrutinizing connection between people and government.  Pluralism in the societies of transitioning nations is an age-old condition, yet its manifestation in politics is a new challenge to be met. To do so, a new system of institutions must be built.